State v. Bolan Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40458 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-19-2013
State v. Bolan Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40458
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bolan Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40458" (2013). Not Reported. 1153.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1153
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No. 40458 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Ada Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2011-18000 
) 
CHRISTINA ALICIA BOLAN, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
__________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
DAPHNEJ.HUANG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
I. Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred 
By Not Ordering Another Psychological Evaluation, 
Under I.C. § 19-2522 .................................................................. 4 
A. lntroduction ...................................................................... 4 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... .4 
C. Invited Error Doctrine Applies .......................................... 5 
D. Bolan Cannot Establish Fundamental Error .................... 6 
E. Bolan Cannot Establish Manifest Disregard .................... 8 
II. Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred 
Or Abused Its Discretion By Inadequately Considering 
Bolan's Mental Health When It Imposed A Sentence 
Of Six Years With Two Years Fixed ......................................... 10 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 10 
B. Standard Of Review ...................................................... 11 
C. The Record Supports That The Sentencing 
Court's And Bolan's Silence Regarding 
Bolan's Mental Health Was A Reasonable 
Rejection Of Mental Health As A Determinative 
Factor At Sentencing ..................................................... 11 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 15 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2011) ........................................ 11 
State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,229 P.3d 1179 (2010) ................... .4, 5, 6, 9 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,264 P.3d 935 (2011) .............................. 11, 12, 14 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ........................................ 4, 5 
State v. Quintana, 2013 WL 2382526 (Ct. App. 2013) ........................... 11, 12, 14 
State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 266 P.3d 1211 (Ct. App. 2011) ...................... 5, 6 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (Ct. App. 2002) ................ 11, 12, 14 
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011) ..................................... 10 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-2522 .............................................................................................. passim 
I.C. § 19-2523 ......................................................................................... 11, 12, 13 
RULES 
I.C.R. 32(d) ........................................................................................................... .. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christina Alicia Bolan appeals from her judgment of conviction on guilty 
plea to felony possession of a controlled substance. Bolan argues the district 
court erred by failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation, and by 
failing to consider Bolan's mental health at sentencing. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Christina Alicia Bolan with felony and misdemeanor 
counts of possessing a controlled substance, and a misdemeanor count of 
possessing drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 6-7, 23-24.) In March 2012, Bolan 
completed a guilty plea advisory and form, and the district court attempted to 
take her guilty plea in court. (R., pp. 55-62; see 3/7/12 Tr.) However, based on 
Bolan's demeanor in court, the judge ordered the marshal to take Bolan for a 
drug test that came back positive for methamphetamine. (3/7/12 Tr., p. 10, L. 8 
- p. 11, L. 8.) Explaining that the court cannot take a guilty plea when Bolan is 
under the influence, the court set the matter over one week. (3/7/12 Tr., p. 11, 
Ls. 14-19.) 
The following week, the district court accepted Bolan's guilty plea and 
ordered a presentence investigation report. (See 3/14/12 Tr.) At Bolan's 
sentencing hearing, the district court ordered a term of six years with two years 
fixed, but retained jurisdiction and recommended placement in the Correctional 
Alternative Placement Program followed by drug court. (R., pp. 64-67.) 
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Less than six months later, Bolan came before the district court again in a 
rider review hearing. (See 10/17/12 Tr.; R., p. 73.) The APSI reported that 
Bolan was dishonest in her programming homework, was screened as high-risk 
in areas associated with criminal behavior, was removed from her GED and 
Moral Reconation Therapy programs, and failed her relapse prevention program. 
(PSI, pp. 110-112.) The APSI thus recommended relinquishment of jurisdiction, 
and the state asked that the court follow the recommendation. (PSI, p. 110; 
10/17/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 15-17.) Bolan did not deny anything from the APSI, but 
requested the opportunity to participate in drug court, and asked that the court 
not impose sentence. (10/17/12 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 8-25; p. 37, Ls. 1-11.) The district 
court concluded Bolan was not appropriate for drug court, and relinquished 
jurisdiction, executing Bolan' sentence of six years with two years fixed. 
(10/17/12 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 16-17; p. 39, Ls. 6-14; R., pp. 74-76.) Bolan timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 78-80.) 
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ISSUES 
Bolan states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the court err by failing to sua sponte order a 
psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522? 
2. Did the court err by failing to consider Christina's mental 
illness when fashioning the sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Bolan failed to show the trial court erred by not ordering another 
psychological evaluation, under I.C. § 19-2522? 
2. Has Bolan failed to show the trial court erred or abused its discretion by 
inadequately considering Bolan's mental health when it imposed a 
sentence of six years with two years fixed? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred By Not Ordering Another 
Psychological Evaluation, Under I.C. § 19-2522 
A Introduction 
On this appeal, Bolan asserts for the first time that the trial court's failure 
to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation violated I.C. § 19-2522. 
According to Bolan, information before the court demonstrated that her mental 
health was a significant factor that should have been addressed at sentencing. 
As discussed below, Bolan fails to satisfy her burden on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, issues must be raised before the trial court to be considered on 
appeal. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
However, an exception applies to criminal defendants deprived of due process 
through fundamental error. lg.; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 820, 229 
P.3d 1179, 1182 (2010). Where the asserted error is the trial court's failure to 
order a psychological evaluation for sentencing purposes, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that "the defendant must demonstrate ... the sentencing court 
manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32." Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 
822, 229 P.3d at 1184. 
The issue whether the fundamental error standard or manifest disregard 
standard applies is currently before the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Carter, 
#39927 (oral argument presented 6/12/2013, decision pending), and State v. 
Clinton, #40461 (oral argument set for 8/27/2013). Under the fundamental error 
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standard, an appellant must demonstrate: (1) violation of an unwaived 
constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear and obvious without need to further 
develop the record; and (3) that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (2010). The manifest 
disregard standard is essentially free review of the district court's action or 
inaction by the appellate court, in light of the record. See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 
817, 229 P.3d 1179. 
The state here asserts, as it has in Carter and Clinton, that the 
fundamental error standard applies. But under either standard, Bolan cannot 
satisfy her burden on appeal. 
C. Invited Error Doctrine Applies 
As an initial matter, Bolan is precluded from asserting error under the 
doctrine of invited error. See State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 114, 266 P.3d 
1211, 1219 n. 4 (Ct. App. 2011). That doctrine estops a party from asserting 
error when her own conduct induces the commission of the error. Id. In other 
words, an alleged error "consented to or acquiesced in" is not reversible. Id. 
The record here establishes that Bolan consented to or acquiesced in the 
omission of an additional psychological evaluation, now claimed as error. 
At Bolan's plea hearing, the district court announced it would order a 
presentence report; neither party requested an evaluation for sentencing 
purposes. (3/14/12 Tr., p. 14, L. 5 - p. 16, L. 9.) The court's colloquy with 
counsel and Bolan at the plea hearing concerned bond and the importance of 
Bolan remaining "clean and sober." (Id.) At sentencing, the district court asked, 
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"Does either party contend there should be additional investigation or evaluation 
of the defendant before sentencing?" to which both parties responded, "no." 
(4/25/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 12-16.) The PSI, prepared for sentencing, referenced 
Bolan's yet-unavailable psychological evaluation from January 201i by clinical 
psychologist David Delawyer. (PSI, pp. 11, 81-100.) An APSI filed after 
sentencing, but before relinquishment of jurisdiction attached several previously 
unavailable medical records, including Bolan's 2012 Psychological Evaluation. 
(See PSI, p. 77.) 
Bolan had every opportunity to request another psychological evaluation, 
and was invited to make such a request at sentencing. By actively declining to 
request an evaluation at any time before her appeal, Bolan invited the error she 
now argues warrants reversal. See Rollins, 152 Idaho at 114, 266 P.3d at 1219 
n. 4. Under Rollins, this Court must reject her argument. 
D. Bolan Cannot Establish Fundamental Error 
Even if this Court finds the invited error doctrine does not apply, Bolan 
cannot establish fundamental error because there is no constitutional right to a 
psychological evaluation for sentencing purposes. See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 
822, 229 P .3d at 1184 (psychological evaluation need not be ordered in every 
case where defendant claims mental illness; decision to order it is in sentencing 
1 Although the PSI mistakenly lists the evaluation's date as 2010, the evaluation 
indicates it was completed January 2012. 
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court's discretion). Indeed, Bolan makes no argument that she had such a right, 
or that the sentencing court violated a constitutional right by not ordering a 
psychological evaluation before sentencing. Thus, the first two prongs of Perry 
are not met. 
If the Court were to consider the third prong of Perry. which it need not, 
Bolan cannot show her proceedings were affected by the court's failure to order 
a psychological evaluation. As evidenced in the transcripts, the focus of the 
court's and Bolan's concerns throughout the court proceedings was Bolan's drug 
problem. (See 3/7/12 Tr.; 3/14/12 Tr.; 4/25/12 Tr.; 10/17/12 Tr.) Memorably, 
when the court first attempted to take Bolan's plea, the court sent Bolan for a 
random drug test that showed she was positive for methamphetamine. (3/7/12 
Tr., p. 10, L. 8 - p. 11, L. 19.) In imposing sentence, the court advised, "I 
thought a lot about this case. I've read this very carefully ... ," and then 
commented on the difficulty of recovery from drug addiction. (4/25/12 Tr., p. 25, 
Ls. 22-23; p. 27, L. 22 - p. 28, L. 10.) The record, carefully read by the court, 
included Bolan's PSI which discussed her recent psychological evaluation and its 
contents, despite not attaching the record. (See PSI, pp. 1-14.) 
At her rider review hearing, the record included Bolan's January 2012 
psychological evaluation. (PSI, pp. 81-100.) The district court's focus did not 
shift from Bolan's substance abuse problem. (See 10/17/12 Tr.) More 
importantly, Bolan did not mention or request mental health services, but asked 
for drug court. (10/17/12 Tr., p. 36, L. 8 - p. 37, L. 1.) Highlighting Bolan's 
inability to be honest through her minimal programming, the court denied Bolan's 
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request, saying, "the only reason you want to do drug court is you want to get 
out. I don't really think you really want to change your behavior." (10/17/12 Tr., 
p. 37, L. 23 - p. 39, L. 5.) The court found drug court inappropriate, but said, 
"Clearly you're in need of some correctional treatment and that can only be 
accomplished within the Department of Corrections. I am going to recommend 
the therapeutic community. I think that would be good for you, but it's going to 
be dependent entirely on your behavior." (10/17/12 Tr., p. 39, L. 20 - p. 40, L. 
2.) 
There is no indication the district court's sentence would have differed had 
an additional psychological evaluation been before the court. Accordingly, Bolan 
fails to satisfy any of the prongs for fundamental error. 
E. Bolan Cannot Establish Manifest Disregard 
If this Court were to apply the manifest disregard standard, Bolan still 
could not satisfy her burden on appeal. Bolan contends the court manifestly 
disregarded I.C.R. 32 by failing to adequately consider Bolan's mental health, as 
would have been shown through another psychological evaluation, which was 
required under I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) 
Section 19-2522 provides, "If there is reason to believe the mental 
condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good 
cause shown, the court shall appoint" a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to 
evaluate and report on defendant's mental condition. I.C. § 19-2522(1). 
However, "[a] psychological evaluation is not required in every case where the 
defendant claims some mental illness or disability," rather, whether to order an 
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evaluation "lies within the sentencing court's discretion" as provided in I.C.R. 
32(d). Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d at 1184 (citations omitted). 
Ultimately, "A district court's election not to order a psychological evaluation will 
be upheld on appeal if the record can support a finding that there was no reason 
to believe a defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at 
sentencing or if the information already before the court adequately met the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)." k!. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Here, the record establishes that all pertinent information of Bolan's 
mental health concerns was already before the court at sentencing. (See PSI, 
pp. 11, 36-45 (GAIN eval.), 59, 62, 67-72, 81-100.) The 2012 evaluation was 
before the court before its decision to execute the sentence of six years with two 
years fixed. (PSI, pp. 77, 81-100.) Indeed, the circumstances of this case 
illustrate the logic and practicality of applying judicial discretion to the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, and thus avoid costs and effort for unnecessary 
evaluations. 
Bolan argues that her January 2012 evaluation did not adequately 
analyze "the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment, or a 
consideration of the risk of danger'' Bolan posed to the public if at large, as 
required in I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Although the evaluation 
does not include subheadings explicitly addressing these topics, it does include 
detailed discussion of Bolan's troubled past, analysis of relevant mental health 
concerns, and diagnoses. (PSI, pp. 81-100.) The evaluation provided abundant 
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information about Bolan's mental health under I.C. § 19-2522, for the court to 
determine a proper sentence. 
Further, although the statute requires that the evaluation address 
identified factors, it imposes no requirement on the court in weighing those 
factors. I.C. § 19-2522. Bolan offers no explanation how another evaluation, if 
more complete under I.C. § 19-2522, would have impacted the outcome of her 
sentencing. Stated another way, Bolan fails to link the court's oral 
admonishments and sentence with a supposed lack of information about risks 
and benefits of mental health treatment or non-treatment, or about Bolan's threat 
to the public. The transcripts reveal no uncertainty by the court, necessitating 
Bolan's further evaluation. Absent evidence the court ignored a need for 
additional evaluation, Bolan fails to show manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32. 
11. 
Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion By 
Inadequately Considering Bolan's Mental Health When It Imposed A Sentence 
Of Six Years With Two Years Fixed 
A. Introduction 
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits 
absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). Bolan does not assert that her sentence 
exceeded statutory limits, or that it is excessive. However, Bolan appears to 
argue the sentencing court abused its discretion - or at least erred - by not 
considering her mental condition. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 5, 9-11.) 
10 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers whether 
the district court (1) was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the 
scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its 
decision through exercise of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 
P.3d 935, 941 (2011 ). A defendant challenging her sentence must show it is 
unreasonable under the facts of the case, considering the objectives of societal 
protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Quintana, 2013 
WL 2382526 at *3 (Ct. App. 2013). The appellate court independently reviews 
the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's character. 
State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122,132,267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) (citation omitted). 
Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is excessive, the 
appellate court will not disturb it. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 
935, 941 (2011) (citation omitted). 
C. The Record Supports That The Sentencing Court's And Bolan's Silence 
Regarding Bolan's Mental Health Was A Reasonable Rejection Of Mental 
Health As A Determinative Factor At Sentencing 
Arguing this case should be remanded for resentencing, Bolan cites State 
v. Quintana, 2013 WL 2382526 (Ct. App. 2013), State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 
267 P.3d 935 (2011), and State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (Ct. App. 
2002). Under those cases, "if the defendant's mental condition is a significant 
issue," the sentencing court must weigh defendant's mental condition, looking to 
factors set out in I.C. § 19-2523. Quintana, at *3 (citing Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 
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264 P.3d at 941); Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476. Those factors 
include: 
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; 
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional 
impairment; 
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; 
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required; 
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the 
public, if at large, or the absence of such risk; 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
at the time of the offense charged. 
I.C. § 19-2523(1 )(a)-(f). 
Section 19-2523 "does not require that a defendant's mental condition be 
the controlling factor at sentencing, nor does it require the district court to 
specifically reference all of the factors." kl at *4 (citing Miller, 151 Idaho at 836, 
264 P.3d at 943; Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476). "The record need 
only show that the court adequately considered the substance of the factors in 
arriving at its sentencing decisions." Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476; 
see also Quintana, at *3; Miller, 151 Idaho at 836,264 P.3d at 943. 
The courts in Quintana, Miller, and Strand each concluded there was no 
abuse of discretion in failing to adequately consider the defendants' mental 
health. Quintana, at *5; Miller, 151 Idaho at 837, 264 P.3d at 944; Strand, 137 
Idaho at 462, 50 P.3d at 477. Similarly, the record in this case fails to support 
that the sentencing court failed to adequately consider Bolan's mental health. 
The record shows instead that the sentencing court sufficiently considered the 
substance of I.C. § 19-2523(1) in making its sentencing decisions. 
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As already discussed, the court's and both parties' chief concern at 
sentencing was Bolan's drug problem. (See 3/7/12 Tr.; 3/14/12 Tr.; 4/25/12 Tr.; 
10/17/12 Tr.) The sentencing court asked counsel if either party believed there 
should be additional investigation or evaluation of Bolan before sentencing, and 
both responded, "no." (4/25/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 12-16.) The court also stated on 
the record that it had thought a lot about the case and reviewed it very carefully. 
(4/25/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 22-23.) At her rider review hearing, Bolan's request was 
for drug court. (10/17/12 Tr., p. 36, L. 8 - p. 37, L. 1.) The record does not 
support Bolan's claim that the evidence of her mental health was simply ignored. 
Rather, the court's and Bolan's silence on the topic speaks to the implicit 
consensus that mental health concerns were not significant given Bolan's 
substance abuse problems. 
Also, although the court and parties were silent as to Bolan's mental 
health, the record was not. The 2012 psychological evaluation, PSI, and APSI 
address Bolan's mental health and substance abuse concerns in detail. (PSI, 
pp. 11, 81-100, 111-15.) Applying the information in those reports to the factors 
in I.C. § 19-2523, it is perfectly reasonable that the court and Bolan identified 
substance abuse - not mental health - as the pertinent concern at sentencing. It 
was Bolan's substance abuse, not mental illness, causing her functional 
impairment, affecting her ability to conform her conduct to the law, and creating a 
risk of danger to others. See I.C. § 19-2523(1). The record does not support 
that the sentencing court ignored the substance of I.C. § 19-2523(1). 
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It is true that, in Quintana, Miller, and Strand, the sentencing courts had 
explicitly addressed the defendants' mental conditions and had referenced 
provider evaluations. Quintana, at *5; Miller, 151 Idaho at 837, 264 P.3d at 944; 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462, 50 P.3d at 477. But those decisions stopped short of 
requiring a sentencing court to do so. Instead, they required only that the 
sentencing court's consideration of mental health factors be adequate. Strand, 
137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476; Quintana, at *3; Miller, 151 Idaho at 836, 264 
P.3d at 943. 
In light of the facts of this case, Bolan has failed to establish that the 
district court's consideration of her mental health - about which Bolan herself 
was utterly mute - was inadequate. Accordingly, Bolan has not shown an abuse 
of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's order 
imposing sentence and relinquishing jurisdiction. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2013. 
D~~ 
Deputy Attorney Gen~ 
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